Cannae
- a village in Apulia, north of Canusium, famous for the victory of Hannibal over the Romans; it lay on the east side of the Aufidus (which is hence called Amnis Canna by Marcius vates ap. Liv. 25, 12, 5), now Canne, id. 22, 44, 1 sq. (Polyb. 3, 113); Flor. 2, 6, 15; Cic. Tusc. 1, 37, 89: Cannarum pugna, Liv. 23, 43, 4; Sil. 9, 10.—Appellative: Capuam Hannibali Cannas fuisse, a second Cannae, Liv. 23, 45, 4; Flor. 2, 6, 21. —
- II Deriv.: Cannensis, e, adj., of Cannae, Cannensian: pugna, Liv. 23, 1, 1; 23, 1, 11; Prop. 3 (4), 3, 10 al.: acies, Liv. 23, 18, 13: calamitas, Cic. Brut. 3, 12: clades, Liv. 22, 50, 1; 25, 12, 5; 23, 30, 11: ruina, id. 23, 25, 3: dies, Flor. 4, 12, 35: exercitus, which was cut to pieces at Cannae, Liv. 29, 24, 11: animae, of those who fell at Cannae, Stat. S. 1, 4, 87.—Appel., of the proscription of Sulla: te pugna Cannensis accusatorem sat bonum fecit, Cic. Rosc. Am. 32, 89; and of a revel: Cannensis pugna nequitiae, id. Verr. 2, 5, 11, § 28; cf. Arn. 5, 38. —As subst.: Cannenses, ium, m., the inhabitants of Cannae, Plin. 3, 11, 16, § 105.
CANNAE(Κάνναι, Strab. et al. Κάννα, Polyb.: Eth. Cannensis: Canne), a small town of Apulia on the S. bank of the Aufidus, about 6 miles from its mouth, celebrated for the memorable defeat of the Romans by Hannibal, B.C. 216. Although no doubt exists as to the site of Cannae itself, the ruins of which are still visible on a small hill about 8 miles from Canosa(Canusium), and the battle was certainly fought on the banks of the Aufidus in its immediate neighbourhood, much question has been raised as to the precise locality of the action, which some have placed on the N., some on the S. of the river: and the previous operations of the Roman and Carthaginian armies have been interpreted so as to suit either view. But if the narrative of Polybius (who is much the most clear and definite upon this question) be carefully examined, it is difficult to see how any doubt can remain, and that of Livy, though less distinct, is in no respect contradictory to it. The other accounts of the battle in Appian, Zonaras, and Plutarch afford no additional information on the topographical question.
Hannibal had wintered at Gerunium, and it was not till early in the summer that he abandoned his quarters there, and by a sudden movement seized on Cannae. The town of that name had been destroyed the year before, but the citadel was preserved, and the Romans had collected there great magazines of corn and other provisions, which fell into the power of the Carthaginians. Hannibal occupied the citadel, and established his camp in its immediate neighbourhood. (Plb. 3.107; Liv. 22.43.) The Roman generals, having received orders to risk a general engagement, followed Hannibal after some interval, and encamped at first about 50 stadia distant from the enemy: but the next day Varro insisted upon advancing still nearer, and the Romans now established two camps, the one on the same side of the Aufidus, where they previously were, (that is evidently the S. side), and the other, containing a smaller division of the forces, on the opposite bank, a little lower down the river, about 10 stadia from the larger Roman camp, and the same distance from that of Hannibal. (Plb. 3.110.) The Aufidus at this season of the year
The battle of Cannae was fought, as we learn from Gellius (Gell. 5.17; Macrob. Sat. 1.16), on the 2nd of August; but it is probable that the Roman calendar was at this time much in advance of the truth, and that the action really took place early in the summer. (Fischer, Röm. Zeittafeln, p. 89.)
is readily fordable at almost any point, and would therefore offer no obstacle to their free communication.On the day of the battle we are distinctly told that Varro crossed the riverwith the main body of his forces from the largercamp, and joining them to those from the smaller, drew up his whole army in a line facing the south.Hannibal thereupon also crossed the riverto meet him, and drew up his forces in a line, having its left wing resting on the river, where they were opposed to the Roman cavalry, forming the right wing of the consular army. (Ib. 113; Liv. 22.45, 46.) From this account it seems perfectly clear that the battle was fought on the northbank of the Aufidus, and this is the result arrived at by the most intelligent travellers who have visited the locality (Swinburne's Travels, vol. i. pp. 167--172; Chaupy, Découv. de la Maison d'Horace, vol. 3. p. 500), as well as by General Vaudoncourt, who has examined the question from a military point of view. ( Hist. des Campagnes d'Annibal, vol. 2. p. 9--34, 48--57.) The same conclusion appears clearly to result from the statement of Livy, that after the battle a body of 600 men forced their way from the lesser camp to the greater, and from thence, in conjunction with a larger force, to Canusium (22.50).
The only difficulty that remains arises from the circumstance that Polybius tells us distinctly that the Roman army faced the S., and the Carthaginian the N. (3.114): and this is confirmed by Livy, who adds that Hannibal thereby gained the advantage of having the wind, called the Vulturnus, behind him, which drove clouds of dust into the face of the enemy (22.47). There seems little doubt that the Vulturnus is the same with the Eurus, or SE. wind, called in Italy the Scirocco, which often sweeps over the plains of Apulia with the greatest violence: hence this circumstance (to which some Roman writers have attached very exaggerated importance) tends to confirm the statement of Polybius. Now, as the general course of the Aufidus is nearly from SW. to NE., it seems impossible that the Roman army, resting its right wing on that river, could have faced the S., if it had been drawn up on the N. bank, and Chaupy, in consequence, boldly rejects the statement of Polybius and Livy. But Swinburne tells us that exactly in that part of the plain where we know, with moral certainty, that the main effort of the battle lay, the Aufidus, after running due E. for some time, makes a sudden turn to the S., and describes a very large semicircle.He supposes the Romans to have forded the river at the angle or elbow, and placing their right wing on its bank at that point, to have thence extended their line in the plain to the E., so that the battle was actually fought within this semicircle. This bend of the river is imperfectly expressed on Zannoni's map (the only tolerable one) of the locality; and the space comprised within it would seem too confined for a battle of such magnitude: but there is no reason to doubt the accuracy of Swinburne, who took his notes, and made drawings of the country upon the spot. The scene of action (he adds) is marked by the name of Pezzo di Sangue, the Field of Blood;but other writers assign a more recent origin to this appellation.
Notwithstanding the above arguments, the scene of the battle has been transferred by local antiquarians and topographers to the S. side of the river, between Cannae and Canusium, and their authority has been followed by most modern historians, including Arnold. Niebuhr, on the contrary, has adopted Swinburne's view, and represents the battle as taking place within the bend or sweep of the river above described. ( Vorträge über Röm. Geschichte, vol. ii. pp. 99, 100.) It may be added that the objection arising from the somewhat confined space thus assigned as the scene of the battle, applies with at least equal force to the opposite view, for the plain on the right bank of the Aufidus is very limited in extent, the hills on which Canusium and Cannae both stand flanking the river at no great distance, so that the interval between them does not exceed half a mile in breadth. (Chaupy, l. c.;Swinburne, l. c.) These hills are very slight eminences, with gently sloping sides, which would afford little obstacle to the movements of an army, but still the testimony of all writers is clear, that the battle was fought in the plain.
The annexed plan has no pretensions to topographical accuracy, there being no good map of the locality in sufficient detail: it is only designed to assist the reader in comprehending the above narrative.
We have little other information concerning Cannae, which appears to have been, up to this time, as it is termed by Florus, Apuliae ignobilis vicus,and probably a mere dependency of Canusium. PLAN OF CANNAE.
A. First camp of the Romans.
B. Second camp of the greater part of the forces; called the larger camp.
C. The smaller do.
D. Camp of Hannibal.
E. Scene of the actual battle.
F. Town or citadel of Cannae.
G. Canusium.
H. Bridge of Canusium.
K K. The Aufidus.
But its name occurs again during the Social War, B.C. 89, when it was the scene of an action between the Roman general Cosconius and the Samnite Trebatius. (Appian, App. BC 1.52.) It appears to have been at this time still a fortress; and Pliny enumerates the Cannenses nobiles clade Romanaamong the municipal towns of Apulia (3.11. s. 16). It became the see of a bishop in the later period of the Roman Empire, and seems to have continued in existence during the middle ages, till towards the close of the 13th century. The period of its complete abandonment is unknown, but the site, which is still known by the name of Canne, is marked only by the ruins of the Roman town. These are described by Swinburne, as consisting of fragments of altars, cornices, gates, walls, and vaults, in themselves of little interest. Little or no value can be attached to the name of Pozzo di Emilio, said to be still given to an ancient well, immediately below the hill occupied by the town, and supposed to mark the spot where the Roman consul perished. (Romanelli, vol. 2. p. 273; Vaudoncourt, l. c.p. 49.)
[E.H.B]A small village of Apulia, situated about five miles from Canusium, towards the sea, and at no great distance from the Aufidus. It was celebrated for the defeat of the Romans by Hannibal. Polybius tells us that, as a town, it was destroyed the year before the battle was fought, which took place on May 21st, B.C. 216. The citadel, however, was preserved, and the circumstance of its occupation by Hannibal seems to have been regarded by the Romans of sufficient importance to cause them considerable uneasiness and annoyance. It commanded, indeed, all the adjacent country, and was their principal southern depot of stores and provisions. The Greek writers, especially Polybius, generally use the name in the singular, Κάννα.
The decisive victory at Cannae was owing to three combined causes: the excellent arrangements of Hannibal, the superiority of the Numidian horse, and the skilful manoeuvre of Hasdrubal in opposing only the light-armed cavalry against that of the Romans, while he employed the heavy horse, divided into small parties, in repeated attacks on different parts of the Roman rear. The Roman army contained 80,000 infantry and 6000 cavalry, the Carthaginians 40,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry. Hannibal drew up his forces in the form of a convex crescent, having his centre thrown forward before the wings. He commanded the centre in person, and here he had purposely stationed his worst troops; the best were posted at the extremities of each wing, which would enable them to act with decisive advantage as bodies of reserve, they being, in fact, the rear of the other forces. Hasdrubal commanded the left wing, Hanno the right. On the Roman side, want of union between the two consuls, and want of spirit among the men, afforded a sure omen of the fortune of the day. Aemilius commanded the right, Varro the left wing; the proconsuls, Regulus and Servius, who had been consuls the preceding year, had command of the centre. What Hannibal foresaw took place. The charge of the Romans, and their immense superiority in numbers, at length broke his centre, which, giving way inward, his army now assumed the shape of a concave crescent. The Romans, in the ardour of pursuit, were carried so far as to be completely surrounded. Both flanks were assailed by the veterans of Hannibal, who were armed in the Roman manner; at the same time the cavalry of the Carthaginians attacked their rear, and the broken centre, rallying, attacked them in front. The consequence was that they were nearly all cut to pieces. The two proconsuls, together with Aemilius the consul, were slain. Varro escaped with seventy horse to Venusia. The Romans lost on the field of battle 70,000 men; and 10,000 who had not been present in the fight were made prisoners. The Carthaginian loss amounted to 5500 infantry and 200 cavalry. Such is the account of Polybius, whose statement of the fight is much clearer and more satisfactory than that of Livy. Hannibal has been censured for not marching immediately to Rome after the battle, in which city all was consternation. But an explanation of his conduct may be found under the article Hannibal. See also the account in DodgeCol. 's valuable military study, Hannibal (N. Y. 1891).
A Roman city 8 km NE of Canosa on the right bank of the Ofanto (ancient Aufidus) on a hill, traditionally called Monte di Canne. In its environs have been discovered Neolithic and Bronze Age sherds, a menhir (to the S on the road to Canusium, mod. Canosa), and Iron Age and archaic Apulian burials, the latter furnished with Daunian geometric ware of the 6th-5th c. B.C. An antiquarium houses these remains and also a documentation of the battle of the second Punic war for which the city is best known, in which Hannibal's Carthaginians defeated a larger Roman army in a classic double envelopment. On the right bank of the Ofanto, generally thought to be the battle site, an immense necropolis of 23,000 sq. m was found in 1937 but has proved to be mediaeval.
A representative portion of the Roman town, including part of the wall, has also been excavated. The character of the shops, columns, and inscriptions along an uncovered ancient street indicate that the city may have served as an emporium for more prosperous Canusium through the time of Julian.
BIBLIOGRAPHYLivy 22; Polyb. 3.107-17.
G. De Sanctis, Storia dei Romani (1907); M. Gervasio, “Scavi di C.,” Iapigia 9 (1938) and 10 (1939); H. H. Scullard, Historia 4 (1955) 474ff; F. Tiné Bertocchi, Ann. dell'Accad. Etr. di Cortona 12 (1961-64).
D. C. SCAVONE