magistratus

măgistrātus, ūs (contr. form: magistras primus, Inscr. Orell. 3798), m. [magister], the office or rank of a magister, a magisterial office, civil office, magistracy.

• I Lit.: honores, magistratus, imperia, potestates, Cic. Lael. 17, 63: magistratūs mandare, id. Mur. 35, 74: dare, id. Agr. 2, 10, 26: alicui committere, id. Planc. 25, 61: magistratum habere, id. Verr. 2, 4, 61, § 137: obtinere, to hold, administer, Caes. B. G. 7, 33: ingredi, to enter upon, Sall. J. 47: magistratu abire, to resign, Cic. Leg. 3, 20, 47: se abdicare, Dig. 1, 2, 2: deponere, Caes. B. G. 7, 33: in magistratu manere, to remain in office, Liv. 5, 11: esse, id. 5, 28: aliquid gerere in magistratu, Cic. Leg. 3, 20, 47: hoc mihi deposco, quod agam in magistratu, id. Verr. 1, 12, 36: lex est generale jussum populi aut plebis, rogante magistratu, Att. Cap. ap. Gell. 10, 20, 2.—There were two kinds of civil offices in Rome, magistratus extraordinarii and ordinarii. To the former belonged the dictators, the magistri equitum, the duumviri perduellionis, the quaestores rerum capitalium, the triumviri mensarii, etc. The latter were divided into the majores: the consulate, praetorship, and censorship; and the minores, to which belonged the aediles, the quaestors, the tribuni plebis, the triumviri, etc. Besides these, there were magistratus patricii, which, at first, were filled by patricians; and, on the other hand, magistratus plebeii, which were filled from the plebs; curules, who had the privilege of using the sella curulis, namely, the consuls, censors, praetors, and aediles curules. On the distinction between magistratus majores and minores, v. esp. Gell. 13, 15, 4; cf. Paul. ex Fest. p. 157.—
• • B Esp.
  • • 1 When magistratus and imperia are joined together, the former denotes magisterial offices in Rome, and the latter the authority of officers in the provinces: magistratus et imperia minime mihi cupiunda videntur, Sall. J. 3; cf.: juris dictionem de fidei commissis, quot annis et tantum in urbe delegari magistratibus solitam, in perpetuum atque etiam per provincias potestatibus demandavit, Suet. Claud. 23: magistratus, as a general rule, is used of civil offices alone, and only by way of exception of military commands; the latter were called imperia: abstinentiam neque in imperiis, neque in magistratibus praestitit, Suet. Caes. 54.—
    • 2 Of military commands: erat in classe Chabrias privatus, sed omnes, qui in magistratu erant, auctoritate anteibat, Nep. Chabr. 4, 1.—
• II Transf., a magistrate, public functionary: quae vox (magistratus) duabus significationibus notatur. Nam aut personam ipsam demonstrat, ut cum dicimus: magistratus jussit; aut honorem, ut cum dicimus: Tito magistratus datus est, Paul. ex Fest. p. 126 Müll.: est proprium munus magistratūs, intelligere, se gerere personam civitatis, Cic. Off. 1, 34, 124; Sall. J. 19: seditiosi, id. ib. 73: creare magistratus, Liv. 5, 17: his enim magistratibus legati Romam venerunt, in their consulate, Nep. Hann. 7: inter filium magistratum et patrem privatum, Gell. 2, 2. —
• • B Esp., sing. collect., the body of magistrates, the municipal administration (cf. Gr. ἀρχή = ἄρχοντες; not in Cic.): ad magistratum senatumque Lacedaemoniorum, Nep. Them. 7. 4; id. Lys. 4, 3; id. Epam. 4, 3.

magistrātus, ūs, m. (magister), I) das Amt-, die Würde eines magister, das obrigkeitliche Amt in Rom, magistratum petere, dare, mandare, habere, Cic.: m. obtinere, Caes.: m. gerere, verwalten, Cic. (u. so magistratus gerere, imperia suscipere, Lact.): m. inire od. ingredi, Sall., od. accipere, antreten, Liv.: magistratum deponere, Caes., od. magistratu abire, Cic.: in magistratu manere, Liv.: magistratum continuare, Liv.: in magistratu esse, Liv.: monumenta (Akten) rerum in magistratu gestarum, Plin. – v. den Ehrenstellen außerhalb Roms, in Sizilien, Cic.: in Gallien, Caes. – II) meton., v. dem, der ein obrigkeitliches Amt verwaltet, eine Magistratsperson, eine obrigkeitliche Person, der Staatsbeamte (unterschieden in magistratus ordinarii od. extraordinarii, je nachdem sie regelmäßig u. zu bestimmten Zeiten od. nur außerordentlich unter bestimmten Umständen gewählt wurden; in curules od. non curules, je nachdem ihnen die sella curulis zustand od. nicht; in patricii od. plebeii, je nachdem sie aus dem Patrizier- oder Plebejerstande genommen wurden; in maiores od. minores (od. inferioris iuris), je nachdem sie auspicia maiora od. minora halten durften, (wobei noch zu bemerken, daß die mag. mai. in den Zenturiatkomitien, die mag. min. in den Tributkomitien bestimmt wurden), est proprium munus magistratus intellegere, se gerere personam civitatis, Cic.: creare magistratus, Liv.: oppida per magistratus administrare, Sall.: magistratus intermittere, die weltlichen Behörden suspendieren, Caes.: his magistratibus, unter ihrer Amtsführung, -ihrem Konsulate, Nep. – Ggstz., magistratus an privatus, Quint.: inter filium magistratum et patrem privatum, Gell. – Sing. kollektiv = das Beamtenkollegium, die obrigkeitliche Behörde, Obrigkeit (wie im Griech. ἀρχή = ἄρχοντες), Nep. Them. 7, 4; Lys. 4, 3 (bei Cicero u.a. Plur. magistratus). – ➳ Abl. magistrato, Lex colon. Genet. im Corp. inscr. Lat. 2, 5439, 4, 2. lin. 4: Nomin. Plur. magistratuus, Corp. inscr. Lat. 10, 3678, magistrates, Charis. 32, 26, magistrati, Fasti Philocali 31. Dec. im Corp. inscr. Lat. 1², p. 278: Akk. Plur. macistratos, Corp. inscr. Lat. 1, 195. lin. 3.

magistratus [CL] 1 the office of a master or magistrate, magisterial dignity, power. b period or term of magistracy; c  (w. obj. gen.); d (as title). quem solum prae omnibus tribunicae potestatis personis et procerum ~ibus dignissimum ratus est Aldh. VirgP 48; 801 divina clementia, quae vos per singulos ~us in altissimum saecularis potentiae evexit honorem Alcuin Ep. 240; ~us, dignitas, wyrþscype GlP 353; regis credatur somnio aut ejus qui ~um gerit J. Sal. Pol. 429B; illi qui cum ~u rei publice causa absunt Ric. Angl. Summa 30 p. 48; ~um gerere non potest [sc. femina] ‥ femine ‥ nec judices esse possunt nec ~um gerere Fortescue NLN II 53.  b in hujus abbatis ~u dejecti sunt monachi albi a Pluscardy et nigri intromissi Ferr. Kinloss 30.  c ~um castellanae ecclesiae ‥ usque ad mortem ei concessit Ord. Vit. III 13 p. 141; 1200 fideli nostro W. M. ‥ et heredibus suis ~um maresc’ curie nostre RChart 46b; 1418 quia nos ~um et custodiam collegii nostri predicti [sc. omnium sanctorum de Maydeston’] per mortem domini S. W., ultimi magistri sive custodis ejusdem ~us solacio destituti Reg. Cant. I 168; 1426 ~u perpetui collegii quinque capellanorum Lit. Cant. III 148; 1456 collacionem ~us sive custodie domus S. A. [sc. Sancti Andree] London’ Reg. Brev. 290v; supremum academiae ~um anno 1501 atque iterum 1504 gessit Anglia Sacra I 382.  d reverendissime magister et domine, vestri ~us excellencie ‥ innotescat quod FormOx 365. 2 magistrate, official. 749 nostri ~us, optimates, et duces fidelissimique amici CS 178; 836 cum meis episcopis et ducibus et ~ibus CS 416; †848 (12c) cum consensu et consilio principum ac ~uum Mercianorum gentis CS 454; omnis etenim ~us justitie famulus est J. Sal. Pol. 569A; quia sic statutum est a ~ibus discuti que ignorantur in questionibus civilibus Kilwardby OS 588. 3 state of being a teacher, preceptorship. vis preesse, antequam subesse aut coesse didiceris, et disciplinatum prevenis ~u P. Blois Ep. 13. 39D; 1431 quia arcium liberalium professor honorabili septem scienciarum triumque philosophiarum ~u conjunctim et divisim dinoscitur decorari StatOx 234. 4 (acad.) master’s degree. 1317 eidem licenciando baccalario, quem ‥ dicunt ‥ fore dignum ‥ ad ~um ipsum FormOx 28; 1435 bifarius gradus, sc. inferior, puta baculariatus, quasi semigradus, et superior, ut ~us, in eadem universitate consueverunt haberi EpAcOx 130; 1473 promocionem ad ~us dignitatem ‥ optes celerem fore Lit. Cant. III 261; 1517 baccalaurei artium ‥ ad gradum ~us intra sex menses promoveantur Stat. Coll. Ox. II Corpus Christi 59.

măgistrātŭs, (7) ūs, m. (magister), ¶ 1 charge, fonction publique, magistrature : Cic. Læl. 63 ; Planc. 61 ; v. petere, inire, adipisci, gerere, obtinere, dare, mandare, deponere ¶ 2 fonctionnaire public, magistrat : Cic. Pis. 35 ; Off. 1, 124 ; Leg. 3, 15 ; Nep. Hann. 7, 2 || sing. collectif = administration : Nep. Them. 7, 4 ; Lys. 4, 3.

magistratus , us. m.
功名。官府。官員。Magistratum gerere 做官。Magistratum inire 接印。

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magistrātus ūs, m

• magister, the office of master, magisterial office, civil office, magistracy: magistratūs, imperia: in magistratibus mandandis: magistratum habere: ingredi, enter upon, S.: magistratu abire, resign: abdicato magistratu, S.: in magistratu manere, remain in office, L.—A magistrate, public functionary: magistratūs adi, Iudicium ut reddant tibi, T.: cum multitudinem hominum magistratūs cogerent, Cs.: legum ministri magistratūs (sunt): seditiosi, S.: his magistratibus, in their consulate, N.: Iura magistratūsque legunt, V.—Collect., the body of magistrates, the municipal administration: potestas magistratui permittitur, S.: unum magistratum cum ipsis habere, Cs.: ad magistratum senatumque Lacedaemoniorum, N.—Military command, office: in classe qui in magistratu erant, N.

MAGISTRATUS

MAGISTRA´TUSMagistratus is properly the abstract form of the concrete magister, but it comes to be used indifferently to indicate the office and the person who holds it. In the S. C. de Bacchanalibus we find magistratus side by side with magister, denoting the governor of a religious guild. In the later practice, however, only the word magister applies to lesser corporations; magistratus is commonly restricted to the person or office of the governors of the Populus Romanus, of the Plebs, and of the municipia and colonies. The powers of the municipal magistrates are discussed elsewhere [see COLONIA]; the following remarks apply to the magistrates of the populus and of the plebs.

Every such magistrate has coercitio, the power within his proper sphere of duty to compel the citizens by force of punishment to obey him, and to avenge any act which argues contempt of his magisterial authority (in ordinem cogere magistratum). He has likewise the power of addressing the people by word of mouth (jus contionis) and by written proclamation (jus edicendi).

The magistrates are grouped in colleges; there are two consuls, ten tribunes, and so forth. But these colleges do not, with very rare exceptions (see Liv. 9.46, 7), act as boards deciding by a majority of votes. Each individual magistrate is invested with the full powers of his college, and is qualified, if not interrupted by his colleagues, to act in all matters alone. A particular subdivision of duties (provinciae) may, however, be prescribed by the senate or people for the individual members of a college. This division is specially important in the case of the praetors at home and of the governors of the transmarine possessions of Rome. The first have particular departments of business assigned to them; the latter have particular localities in which they are to exercise their functions. When it may be a matter of dispute which of the equally qualified persons is to perform a particular act or series of acts, the question has to be settled by arrangement, by taking turns, or by the lot.

Magistratus Populi Romani. --Though the word seems never to be applied directly to the king, our authorities trace all magistracy back to the regal power. Pomponius, for instance (Dig. 1.2, 2, 14), begins his discussion with the words, Quod ad magistratus attinet, initio civitatis hujus constat reges omnem potestatem habuisse. At the institution of the consulship this power was put in commission. Regio imperio duo sunto, is Cicero's description of the office (de Leg. 3.3, 8); and Livy (Liv. 2.1, 7) comments--libertatis originem inde magis quia annuum imperium consulare factum est, quam quod deminutum quicquam sit ex regia potestate, numeres. Omnia jura, omnia insignia primi consules tenuere.

The college representing the kingly power was modified by various additions and alterations; as, for instance, when a dictator was co-opted into it as a superior colleague, or praetors were created as inferior colleagues to the consuls, or when their place was filled by an interrex or by tribunes with consular power. Each one of these officials had the imperium: he possessed, like the kings, the right to command the individual citizen in peace and war [see IMPERIUM], and to be the president and mouth-piece of the sovereign corporation, the Populus Romanus. Further certain specialised functions were committed to assistants not invested with these plenary powers: such were the censors, curule aediles, and quaestors, besides the lesser officials, who collectively made up the vigintivirate. The more specific name for power (imperium) being denied to these, the generic term potestas serves as descriptive of their authority. Thus we may say at pleasure consularis potestas or consulare imperium, but only censoria potestas. To both classes belong the auspicia patriciorum, and all holders of these offices are magistratus patricii, whether they be personally members of the patrician order or not.

Messalla (Aul. Gell. 13.14) divides these auspicia patriciorum into greater and lesser, and the magistrates in like manner into majores and minores. The censor, from the practical importance of his office, ranks among the majores magistratus; but with this exception Messalla's division of greater and lesser answers to the division between those magistrates who have and those who have not the imperium. The greater magistrates receive their office from the populus assembled by centuries, the lesser magistrates from the populus assembled by tribes. What Messalla says is confirmed by Cicero's account (ad Fam. 7.30) of the proceedings of Caesar. When assembling the populus for the election of quaestors, he was tributis comitiis auspica-tus; when in the course of the day he wished to elect a. consul instead, centuriata habuit. Messalla proceeds to point out, however, that the powers of magistracy are more formally and regularly (justius) entrusted by the subsequent passing of a Lex Curiata. All the magistrates with imperium are colleagues, and so their auspices may collide (turbant, retinent, vitiant, obtinent), in which case those of the superior override those of the inferior. In illustration of this we find that a praetor acting in the field in conjunction with a consul could not, though he had an imperium of his own, claim a triumph, because his imperium and his auspices were overborne by those of the consul (Val. Max., 2). It is certain that any of the magistrates cum imperio could in the same way overbear any of the minor magistrates. On the other hand, Messalla tells us that a magistrate may be non ejusdem potestatis, non eodem rogatus auspicio with another. In this case the two have not merely different provinciae or spheres for the exercise of their authority, but the authority itself is different; they are not colleagues, and no collision of their auspices is possible. Such was the censor in relation to the consul or praetor, and such by parity of reasoning would be the curule aedile in relation to the quaestor. The same principle obtains in the matter of intercessio. It is summed up in the words of Cicero (de Leg. 3.3, 6): ni par majorve potestas prohibessit. Magistrates non ejusdem potestatis cannot veto each other's actions.

The magistrates cum imperio alone had the jus agendi cum populo. The voice of the Roman people could be uttered only in answer to a question (rogatio) put to it by such a magistrate. This power could not be delegated in case of elections or of legislation; but when the people met to hear an appeal from the sentence of a magistrate in a criminal case, the consul or praetor might lend his auspices to an inferior (as, for instance, the quaestor), who could then preside and put the question. [See Varro, L. L. 6.91, ad praetorem aut ad consulem mittas auspicium petitum; and 93, alia de causa hic magistratus (quaestor) non potest exercitum urbanum convocare. ]

As all magisterial power is derived from the people, it follows that those magistrates who have the jus agendi cum populo must provide for the succession, not only in their own college, but in all the other magistracies. The censor or the curule aedile cannot submit the question of the choice of their successors to the people, but this must be done by the consul or praetor. The presiding officer is said rogare or creare the newly elected magistrate. Most modern writers (including Mommsen) hold that this is a relic of an ancient power of nomination or selection on the part of the magistrate, that the obligation to consult the people on the choice is of later origin, and that the primary notion of magistracy is that of a power passing from hand to hand through successive generations of officers. This opinion is, however, in direct contradiction to the belief of the Romans themselves, who represented the higher magistrates, including the king, as chosen from the first by the people; and the cases adduced in favour of the modern hypothesis seems inconclusive. The co-optation of the dictator is an exception, which is probably to be explained on the ground that he was to be appointed in emergencies when the delay necessary for a popular election might be dangerous. Nor is it safe to draw any conclusion from the fact that neither the Rex Sacrificulus nor the Pontifex Maximus was elected by the people. The Romans were evidently uneasy lest by abolishing the kingship they should have offended the gods, and it was not unnatural that, when severing the oversight of religion from the chief magistracy, they should have emphasised the partition of functions by committing the transmission of religious power to the Sacred College itself. Mommsen's theory necessarily leads him to believe that the interrex who reigned for only five days was entrusted with the enormous responsibility of imposing on the people a ruler for life. There is no need to accept the premises which lead to so improbable a conclusion. The unanimous evidence of the ancients justifies us in regarding the people as the fount of power, and in limiting the part of the magistrate in the creation of his successor to those sufficiently ample powers which belonged to him as the necessary convener and regulator of the assembly which had to elect.

Jurisdictio, the power of administering justice between the citizens, belongs in its full extent only to the magistrate cum imperio. The formal competence of every such magistrate to administer justice is recognised in the fictitious lawsuits necessary for manumissions, adoptions, and transfers of property (in jure cessio). The consul or even the pro-consul at the gates of the city may hold a court for such purposes. But all serious litigation at Rome is specially reserved as the provincia of one or other of the praetors. After the conquest of Sicily, that island was made the province of a special praetor, who exercised therein the fullest jurisdictio, and similar functions were assigned to the governors of districts subsequently annexed. Besides the full jurisdiction which goes with imperium, a limited jurisdiction in special cases belongs to the curule aediles, the decemviri litibus judicandis, and to the municipal magistrates. [See JURISDICTIO]

Criminal justice--that is, the punishment of heinous offences, supposed to endanger the state--falls likewise under the imperium. But the action of the magistrate in this sphere is early limited by the right of appeal to the people, when the punishment to be inflicted is serious. This right subjects the magistrate to the necessity of defending his sentence and to the possibility of having it reversed; it practically reduces him from a judge to an accuser. Such a situation was felt to be beneath the dignity of the superior magistrate; and accordingly we find that he habitually refrained from the exercise of any such powers, and allowed the task of condemning or accusing to devolve on his inferiors (at first probably his delegates) the duoviri perduellionis and the quaestors. By a curious combination of constitutional exigencies, the tribune may find himself with regard to the centuriate trial in the same position as the quaestor. If he has condemned a citizen to death, and is appealed against, his own (plebeian) assembly is, by the law of the Twelve Tables, incapable of hearing the case; he must therefore ask one of the magistrates cum imperio for a day of the Comitia Centuriata: see Liv. 43.16, 11, Utrique censori perduellionem se judicare pronuntiavit (tribunus), diemque comitiis a C. Sulpicio praetore urbano petiit. Whenever provocatio is suspended, as on the appointment of a dictator or on the decree of senate or people to constitute a special quaestio, the superior magistrate is seen as criminal judge, and inflicts death by virtue of his imperium. The most notable case is the proceeding against the Bacchanalians in B.C. 186, of which a full account is given by Livy (Liv. 39.14-19).

A relic of the criminal jurisdiction of the consuls and praetors survived in their power to sharpen their coercitio by throwing citizens into prison. This was a consequence of their right of summons and seizure (vocatio et prensio) as a preliminary to trial. This right was not possessed by the inferior magistrates, who could only enforce their orders by seizing pledges or inflicting a small fine.

The senate is the consilium or authorised body of advisers attached to the chief magistrate. Accordingly only those magistrates of the Roman people who as possessors of the imperium represent the kingly office, can summon and consult the senate. This power is absent from the censor, the curule aedile, and the quaestor. These magistrates appear, however, no less than those cum imperio, to have been relieved during their term of office from the duty of giving advice as senators (suo loco sententiam dicere) to the presiding magistrate. On the other hand, they could, any of them, address an official statement to the senate (verba facere) regarding the matter in hand.

The office of the magistrate ceases immediately on the expiry of the period for which he has been elected. If he is present in the city (domi), his powers lapse with his office; but if he is absent on service (militiae), he is to continue at his post and exercise all powers until he is relieved by a successor. Meanwhile he is acting pro consule, pro praetore, or pro quacstore, as, the case may be. Such a necessity could hardly arise, while a campaign lasted only for a single summer. When in B.C. 326, during the Samnite War, it became desirable for the consul Q. Publilius Philo to remain at the head of his army for a second year, a special decree of the people to extend his command, though not strictly necessary, was held to be proper, and for some time this precedent appears to have been followed. By the time of the Second Punic War, however, it is recognised that a simple decree of the senate is sufficient for the prorogation of an existing command. It is otherwise of course when a command pro consule is conferred on a private man--as for instance on P. Scipio, when he went to Spain in B.C. 211. For this a law of the populus or the plebs is always necessary.

It may perhaps be counted as an exception to the rule of purely local division, that the pro-magistrate cannot preside at the meetings either of senate or people, even when these are held outside the walls. These are the exclusive prerogatives of the actual magistrates. The pro-magistrate is commonly confined, even more strictly than the magistrate in his year of office, to a special district as his provincia. The Lex Majestatis of Sulla particularly forbids him to overstep the bounds of that district. When he has handed over his province to a successor, his power is therefore in abeyance, but it is not extinguished till he enters the city gates. He still keeps his official title, and wears his official dress: he is still attended by lictors and axes, and exercises formal acts of jurisdiction. At a word from the senate he is authorised to stir up again his dormant imperium; and when the state is in danger, those who are present with pro-consular command near the city are included in the mandate which arms the magistrates against the enemy: see Caesar, Bell. Civ. 1.5, dent operam consules, praetores, tribuni plebis, quique pro consulibus sint ad urbem, ne quid respublica detrimenti capiat.

Magistratus plebis. --When the non-patrician Romans formed themselves into an exclusive corporation on the Mons Sacer in B.C. 449, their first act was to elect magistrates of their own; and these officers, the tribunes and aediles of the plebs, existed from thenceforth side by side with the magistrates of the Roman people. The resemblances and differences between the functions of the two kinds of magistrate produce some of the most curious complexities known to any constitution. The authority of the plebeian magistrates was from the first acknowledged (though somewhat grudgingly) by the whole community, inasmuch as the law of the state accorded to them the right absolutely to protect the private citizen against any action of the patrician magistrate. As the corporation of the plebs gradually assumed to itself the right to legislate on matters concerning the whole community, its officers became necessarily more and more magistrates of the Roman state. When by the Hortensian Law (B.C. 287) the decree of the plebs was formally placed on an equal footing of power with the decree of the sovereign populus, the reason for any distinction between the magistrates of the two corporations really disappeared. In the case of the plebeian aediles this distinction was practically abolished. Originally the subordinate assistants of the tribune and his instruments in giving effect to his duty of protection, the aediles of the later Republic were assimilated to the minor magistrates of the Roman people. Though still necessarily plebeians, and elected by the plebs, their powers and duties bore no relation to their original functions, but were precisely similar to those of their curule namesakes. This identity is best illustrated by the fact that Caesar divided the city into wards, each in charge of a single aedile, without any distinction between the two kinds. The plebeian (like the curule) aedileship gave the opportunity for conciliating the people by gifts and shows, and so paving the way of the candidate to the higher posts. In the ordinary career of a Roman statesman the office was a step in advance, after a man had served the tribunate and before he proceeded to the praetorship.

The position of the tribune in the later Republic is much more anomalous. As the ruling magistrate of his corporation he has the jus agendi cum plebe, which confers on him precisely the same powers of initiative in legislation as are possessed by the consul who puts the question to the populus. The senate likewise is assigned as a consilium of advisers to him as well as to the consul, and he has the same right of summoning it and eliciting its decrees. So far we have only a multiplication of the chief magistracy. But here the identity ceases. The tribune had not the essential attribute of the chief magistrates of the Populus Romanus, the imperium. He could neither command in war nor administer justice between the citizens. On the other hand, certain eminent prerogatives derived from the historical nature of his office survived. The word of might that guards the weak from wrong had been made effective by investing the person of the tribune with sacrosanctitas, and this sacrosanctitas could be used in attack as well as in defence. The coercitio of him whom it is death to resist must necessarily overbear all other authority. If the tribune thinks fit to throw the consul into prison or to drag the censor to the Tarpeian rock for execution (Pliny, Plin. Nat.7.143), no one but another tribune can hinder him. In like manner the intercessio of the tribune transcends the rule that magistrates non ejusdem potestatis cannot interfere with one another. The veto of the tribune is absolute over the actions of consul, of praetor, and of censor, while these have no corresponding power over him. In case of collision the patrician magistrate must always yield to the sacrosancta potestas. Such powers would be nothing short of a legalised tyranny, were they placed in a single hand. As a matter of fact the great number of the tribunes, and the principle that each of them could hinder the action of his colleague, rendered these enormous powers practically harmless. In ordinary times the college of tribunes, divided against itself, excluded from military command, and incapable of action outside the city walls, possessed little influence or dignity, and was commonly the humble instrument of the senate, and a convenient check on any vagaries of the superior magistrates. (See Liv. 28.45; 45.21-Z2.) The survival, however, of so irrational an institution became eminently dangerous in times of revolution. In the hands of the Gracchi the tribunician power proved strong enough to over-bear the other elements of the constitution, and could be resisted only by violence and bloodshed. Under the control of Marius, of Pompey, and of Caesar, the same office afforded an effective support to the military chiefs against the senatorial government. After serving for a century the purpose of party strife or of individual ambition, the power of the plebeian magistrate, united at last with military and provincial command, became the basis of the despotism of the emperors. For their appointment, see NOMINATIO

(This article is in the main a summary of the first volume of Mommsen's Staatsrecht, to which the reader is referred for more detailed information.)

[J.L.S.D]

Magistrātus

at Rome, designated alike the office and the office-holder, the magistracy and the magistrate.

I. The Republican Magistrates. In the widest sense the term magistratus included all the governmental officers of the State, elected and appointed, civil and military. In a narrower sense it was restricted to the officials elected by the Roman people, excluding the promagistrates (proconsuls, propraetors, etc.), whose authority rested on decrees of the Senate, and the subordinate officers with delegated powers who were appointed by the magistrates. In the narrowest and most usual sense the term was not extended to include the subordinate military officers (tribuni militum) or the city officials below the rank of quaestor (vigintisexviri, curatores, etc.), in spite of the fact that these were elected by the people. On the other hand the dictator or magister populi and his lieutenant, the magister equitum, although not elected, were always regarded and described as magistrates.

1. Historical Development. In the early Republic the only regular or ordinary magistrates were the consuls and the quaestors; the only extraordinary magistrates the dictator and his lieutenant. The tribunes and aediles of the plebs, officials whose right and duty it was to protect their order against the regular magistrates, were not regarded as magistrates until the struggle between the orders had come to an end. The decemviri legibus scribendis (B.C. 451-449) and the military tribunes (B.C. 444-367), who for a time replaced the consuls and exercised consular powers, were regarded as magistrates; and so also were the censors, praetors, and curule aediles, officials who were first elected during or at the close of the conflict between the orders. With the termination of this conflict and the recognition of the plebeian tribunes and aediles as representatives of the whole people, the list of magistrates, as the term was commonly employed, was closed. For fuller description, see the special article upon each magistracy. For the promagistracy, fully developed only towards the end of the Republic, see provincia.

From the period of the conflict between the orders dates the division of magistracies into “patrician” and “plebeian.” In the later Republic the term patrician magistracy was merely an historical reminiscence; it designated the offices from which the plebeians had formerly been excluded. The term plebeian magistracy, on the other hand, continued to express a fact; the offices of tribune and of plebeian aedile were never thrown open to the patricians.

2. The Relation of the different Magistrates to each other was not determined, at Rome, by assigning to each office special and distinct powers and duties; nor were the different magistrates protected against each other's interference. The earliest magistrates, the consuls, held an undifferentiated complex of military, judicial, and administrative powers; and the creation of new magistracies was not at first accompanied (except in the case of the censors) by any logical separation of these powers. The trend of development, especially in the later Republic, was towards a division of provinciae or spheres of power; but the separation never became complete. Powers of interference were so general as to amount to a fundamental principle of the constitution—a principle which found its extreme expression in the tribunate.

The Romans themselves classed their magistrates not according to the kind of power, but according to the degree of power, which each exercised. Their term for general power was imperium. The dictator and his lieutenant, the consuls and the praetors, all had imperium. The consular imperium was minus as regarded the dictator and his lieutenant, maius as compared with that of the praetors. The other magistrates (censors, tribunes, aediles, quaestors, etc.) had not imperium—i. e. their powers were not general, but special. These, therefore, strictly speaking, were all lower or lesser magistrates (magistratus minores). The censors, however, by reason of the importance of their duties, were regularly classed among the magistratus maiores; and so also, on more technical grounds, were the curule aediles.

Maior potestas. In principle, any magistrate with imperium might issue commands and prohibitions to any magistrate without imperium. The exceptions to this rule were as follows: neither the tribunes nor the censors were subject to the commands or prohibitions of the magistrates with imperium; and the tribunes might intervene negatively, by prohibitions, against the acts of all magistrates except the dictator, his lieutenant, and the censors. The exceptional position of the censors was due to their possession of a distinct field of duties. They had no occasion to interfere with other magistrates, and no other magistrates were permitted to interfere with them. The peculiar position of the tribunes was a survival from the period of the conflict between the orders. Negatively the tribunes had maior potestas as against the consuls; but no Roman would have so expressed it, for the Romans meant by potestas power to act rather than power to prevent.

In principle, again, a magistrate with maius imperium might issue commands to a magistrate with minus imperium; so that a dictator might command and restrain a consul, and a consul might similarly direct or check a praetor.

Par potestas. Further possibilities of interference resulted from the fact that every magistracy except the dictatorship was held by two or more persons. Between such colleagues there was, in principle, no division of power; each possessed all the powers of the office. Each, therefore, might act alone, and without regard to the views or wishes of his colleague or colleagues; and if they remained passive, his act was valid and effective. But if a colleague stepped in (intercessit) and forbade the act, then equal power stood opposed to equal power and the result was a deadlock. This was true not merely as between two colleagues, but also when a larger number held the same magistracy; majority rule was not recognized; the negative will of one was as powerful as the positive will of any larger number. A veto, therefore, could not be vetoed—a rule which was of peculiar importance in the tribunate. In that body one tribune could prevent the other nine from doing any positive act—e. g. from presenting a bill to the people; but nine tribunes could not prevent one from vetoing the act of a consul or other magistrate.

Provinciae. In principle, therefore, the positive powers of each magistracy could be exercised only when the colleagues were of one mind; and this unanimity was necessary for each single act. In fact, however, some division of power, by agreement or by lot, was customary from the earliest period of the Republic (e. g. one consul sometimes took the field with an army while the other governed the city); but it does not appear that in the early Republic any such division of the field of consular duties was made for the year. The assignment to a single magistrate of a distinct field of power for his full annual term apparently dates from the establishment of the praetorship. The praetor was not simply a judicial officer, nor was his authority limited to the city; but by force of constant custom civil jurisdiction within the city became his peculiar “province.” When a second praetorship was instituted, B.C. 242, a division of the judicial field became usual; but the assignment to each praetor of his special competence was made after election and by lot. The same system prevailed when the number of praetors was successively increased to four, six, and eight, and when such distinct functions as the government of subject provinces and the presidency of special criminal courts (quaestiones) were attached to the office. No Roman was ever elected to a special praetorship; he was simply elected praetor, and his special duties were determined by lot. The same system was extended to the quaestors, and gradually, in the later Republic, to the consuls. For some time after the establishment of the city praetorship the consuls acted jointly. They even took the field together, the supreme command alternating day by day. But as foreign wars became more numerous they began, often by the advice of the Senate, but technically, in every case, by agreement, to divide the legions and the field of military operations, and to draw lots for their respective armies and “provinces.” The Senate indeed might recommend or the people decree the assignment of a particular campaign or territory to a particular magistrate extra sortem; but this was unusual.

From the fact that all magistrates of equal rank were colleagues with equal powers and that the division of functions here described was primarily a de facto rather than a legal division, it followed, in principle, that either consul could interfere with the other in the field of military operations, and that any praetor could intercede against the act of any other praetor in the city. Such interference was practically impossible outside of the city, if different fields of activity had been assigned to the consuls, because of the rule that intercession must be made in person; and within the city it was regularly excluded by custom (but see Cicero, Verr. i. 46, 119).

3. Powers of the Magistrates. The imperium conferred upon the higher magistrates was, in principle, the same sort of power that had been exercised by the kings (imperium regium). It was primarily military power (imperium militiae), and was understood to include all governmental power not distinctly withheld by custom or law. Special limitations were first imposed in the field of justice, criminal and civil. The royal power of capital punishment has been practically annulled, according to Roman tradition, by the recognition of a right to appeal to the assembly (provocatio); and in the early Republican period this power passed wholly to the people, the magistrate retaining only the power to investigate and accuse. The power of the magistrates to fine was also limited by law. Civil cases were regularly referred, for decision, to a private iudex or arbiter, or a board of elected iudices. All these limitations, however, were confined to the city; and the restrictions afterwards imposed upon imperium out of the city (e. g. right of appeal in capital cases) were less extensive. Outside of the city, moreover, the magistrates with imperium were freed from the interference of the tribunes. The Romans accordingly came to distinguish imperium militiae from imperium domi, the complete power exercised beyond the city limits from the restricted power exercised within the city. The dictator alone had imperium militiae within the city—i. e. by the appointment of a dictator the city was placed under martial law.

Practically, of course, the governmental power of the higher magistracy was lessened by the multiplication of magistrates, by their short terms of office, and by their accountability to the people after the expiration of their terms. The power of the single magistrates was also practically diminished, in the later Republic, by the assignment of special fields of action to special magistrates; but in spite of all these facts, no magistrate clothed with imperium was ever regarded as an officer of special, designated powers. Imperium was always, in theory, general power; and every magistrate with imperium had, as against the people, all powers not legally denied him. The consuls, by virtue of their higher imperium, had residuary governmental power, not only as against the people, but also as against the magistrates with lower imperium and those without imperium—i. e. a consul could do whatever law and custom had neither forbidden to him nor assigned to the exclusive competence of another magistrate.

Special powers included in imperium, many of which were exercised also by magistrates without imperium, were as follows: (1) Ius agendi cum populo—i. e. the right of summoning and presiding over the meetings of the people (comitia centuriata), submitting proposals to them, causing a vote to be taken and announcing the result. Whether the business of the meeting was legislation, criminal justice, or the election of magistrates for the ensuing year, the initiative was wholly in the magistracy. The magistrates determined the form of a bill and accepted or rejected proposed amendments. They decided whether accusation should be brought against a person suspected of crime, and what penalty the people should be asked to impose. They submitted the list of candidates to be voted for, and no names could be brought before the people without their assent. This ius agendi cum populo belonged exclusively to the magistrates with imperium. The tribunes, however, had similar control over the meetings of the plebeians; and when the concilia plebis had developed into the comitia tributa and had obtained concurrent powers of legislation, a limited criminal jurisdiction and the right of electing the lower magistrates, the ius agendi cum plebe gave the tribunes an initiative similar to that of the consuls and praetors. The analogous right of summoning the Senate and obtaining an expression of its opinion, originally an exclusive right of the magistrates with imperium, was also extended to the tribunes. In the field of legislation the power of the tribunate thus became legally equivalent to that of the magistrates with imperium. Practically it was greater; for if a consul or a praetor proposed a bill to the popular assembly or a resolution to the Senate, the tribunes could veto the proposal and thus arrest legislative action, while they themselves were not subject to such interference from the other magistrates. It is therefore not surprising that the most important laws of the later Republic were plebiscita proposed by the tribunes.

(2) Ius edicendi. The people alone could establish a law (lex); but all magistrates had power to issue commands and prohibitions (edicta, interdicta) and means of punishing disobedience. Their ordinances, therefore, had the force of law (legis vicem), at least during the terms of the magistrates who issued them. In principle there was nothing to prevent a magistrate from invading by his edicts the field of general legislation. In the later Republic the development and the reform of the private law were chiefly accomplished by the edicts of the praetors, and important contributions to the law of sale were made by the aediles. As a rule, however, the ordinances of the magistrates were not intended to override the general law, but to secure its observance; and the edicts and interdicts of each set of magistrates were commonly confined to that sphere of administration which law and custom allotted them.

(3) Ius coercendi. The means by which the magistrates enforced obedience to their commands were as follows: (a) prensio, arrest; (b) in vincula ductio, imprisonment; (c) verberatio, scourging; (d) multae dictio, imposition of a fine; (e) pignoris captio, seizure of movable property. All of these powers were included in imperium; the second and third were accorded only to magistrates with imperium. Imprisonment ordered by a magistrate was probably limited to his term of office; from a sentence of scourging in urbe a lex Valeria authorized an appeal to the people. The power to arrest was held by the tribunes and by the censors. The powers of fining and of seizing property were apparently exercised by all the magistrates,[footnote: The power of the quaestors to fine is disputed by Mommsen. But even curatores could fine. (See Karlowa, Rechtsgeschichte, p. 171.)] and constituted the ordinary and normal method of coercion. That it was a very ancient method is shown by numerous Aryan analogies, and by the fact that among the Romans fines were originally levied in sheep and oxen. The power to fine was first limited by the rule that the fine must not exceed the half of the estate of the delinquent; later laws (Aeternia Tarpeia, Menenia Sestia [?]) confined multae dictio to a definite maximum (two sheep and thirty oxen; two sheep and five oxen. For an ingenious explanation of these numbers, see Karlowa, pp. 167- 169). The magistrate who wished to fine beyond the legal maximum had to obtain the consent of the assembly (multae irrogatio). By the lex Iulia Papiria money fines were introduced and a pecuniary maximum substituted, the sheep being reckoned at ten as, the ox at one hundred. Pignoris captio, like imprisonment, might be employed to secure the payment of a fine; but it was often (and perhaps originally) used as a milder means of constraint, the property being restored to the owner if he promptly purged himself of contempt and subjected himself to the commands of the magistrate.

The fact that the tribunes could arrest (prendere) other magistrates, while the leges sacratae protected them against all coercion, was the key to their peculiar position in the Roman State.

(4) Auspicia. Before taking any important step, it was the right and the duty of the magistrates to ascertain whether the act in contemplation was favoured by the gods. (See augur.) The magistrate who acted without proper auspices, or in defiance of unfavourable auspices, took the risk of punishment at the end of his term; and if his act was of a legal nature (e. g. the calling of comitia), it was the right and duty of the Senate, after obtaining the expert opinion of the augurs, to rescind the act and annul its results (e. g. the passage of a lex or the choice of magistrates). Auspices were regularly taken, at least in the earlier Republic, by the augurs; but the answer of the gods, as interpreted by these priests, referred to the inquiry of the magistrate at whose instance the auspices were taken. It was, of course, possible that the gods should be consulted on the same matter by different magistrates, and that different answers should be obtained. The result was then determined by the relative authority of the magistrates: maiora auspicia (i. e. auspices taken at the instance of a magistrate with maior potestas) overrode minora. As between colleagues with par potestas, unfavourable auspices prevailed over those of a favourable character.

It is a plausible hypothesis that in the early Republic, when the entire constitution had a sacral colour, the doctrine of maior and par potestas was worked out by the priests in the form of a doctrine of auspices. It accords with this theory that the lower patrician magistrates were under the auspices of the higher, and that the non-magistrate, who exercised delegated powers, was said to act under the auspices of the magistrate who appointed him.

4. Responsibility. The lower magistrates, as we have seen, were generally subject to the control of the higher, and the higher magistrates to the negative control of the tribunate; but the magistracy, as a whole, was not subject to the direct control of the people, or even to the control of the law. It enjoyed regal irresponsibility. During their terms of office the higher magistrates could not be made defendants in civil actions (in ius vocari), nor could criminal proceedings be instituted against them. In the later Republic magistrates were occasionally deposed by a vote of the assembly which had created them, but such action was contrary to the spirit of the constitution.

An indirect control of a moral character was exercised by the consilia of the magistrates (see below) and by the Senate (q. v.); and a very strong indirect control lay in the unlimited responsibility of the magistrates after their terms of office had expired. Not only did they then become liable to ordinary civil and criminal proceedings, but they might be punished by the people on purely political grounds.

5. Expenses. The republican magistrates received no pay; the technical term for office was honour; but they were not expected to waste their substance in the service of the State. They were provided with an ample force of paid assistants and attendants. (See apparitores; scribae.) If their duties called them out of the city, they received a liberal outfit from the treasury, and were entitled to transportation and sustenance sumptu publico. What they could not obtain by requisition from the subjects of Rome, they paid for; and for such outlays they were reimbursed from the treasury. In the later Republic it was not unusual to grant round sums by way of allowance for expenses, without requiring any account to be rendered.

6. Insignia, attendants, etc. The quasi-royal position held by the magistrates was strikingly expressed in the ceremonial and formal distinctions accorded them. The years were designated by the names of the consuls. The higher magistrates were accompanied, within and without the city, by numerous public attendants. Before the highest magistrates, those clothed with imperium, marched lictors, bearing the symbols of punitive power. When a magistrate approached, the citizens rose from their seats, dismounted from their horses, descended from their carriages. The lower magistrates observed the same respect towards those of higher authority. Public business was transacted by a seated magistracy in the presence of a standing people. Magistrates who acted singly had chairs or stools (sellae); those who, like the tribunes, acted collectively, as a board, sat on benches (subsellia). The higher magistrates had stools of a special pattern (the sella curulis), and their garments were distinguished from those of the ordinary citizens. On ceremonial occasions ex-magistrates were permitted to resume the distinctive apparel of their office, and it was ostentatiously associated with their memory by their descendants (ius imaginum). For details, see apparitores; insignia.

7. Consilia. It was a principle of Roman law, private and public, that he who exercised power over others should not act unadvised. It was equally a principle of the law that advice was not binding. The power to act was not impaired by the dissent of advisers, nor did their assent diminish or divide responsibility.

The Senate, which had been the council of the kings, was also, in a broad sense, the council of the whole higher magistracy; but each magistrate had a special consilium. This always included any lower magistrates who were assigned to the same “province,” or field of administration, and the principal assistants or deputies selected by the magistrate himself; but it also included persons chosen by him as advisers simply. The choice was limited, by custom, to the senatorial and equestrian orders. It was often based on personal friendship, but chiefly on the reputation of the persons chosen for knowledge and experience of affairs. In the administration of justice the urban and peregrine praetors and the provincial governors were regularly assisted by the counsel of the most eminent Roman jurists.

8. Election, terms, etc. All the magistrates, except the dictator, were elected (creati) by the people; the higher magistrates, including the censors and curule aediles, by the comitia centuriata; the tribunes, plebeian aediles, quaestors, vigintisexviri, curatores, and military tribunes, by the comitia tributa. All except the censors were elected annually; the censors every fifth year. All were elected during the year preceding their assumption of office, the magistrates in office (consuls, praetors, or tribunes) summoning and directing the comitia in which their successors were chosen. The election of tribunes took place in July; that of the other magistrates later in the year. See comitia.

The term of office, except in the case of the dictator and in that of the censors, was one year. The dictatorship was limited to six months. The censors originally held office until their work was done; later, the rule was established that their work must be done in eighteen months. The annual terms, in the early Republic, did not begin at any fixed date; in case of abdication or death of both consuls, their successors were chosen, not for the residue of the term, but for a full year. In the later Republic the practice was changed; at the close of the third century B.C. the official year began on the 15th of March; in the second century it began on the 1st of January. The quaestors, however, took office December 5th, and the tribunes December 10th.

Lex curiata de imperio. According to Roman tradition, the king-elect had no imperium until it was granted him by a special law. Under the Republic the consuls and praetors, at the beginning of their terms of office, were obliged to summon the old patrician assembly (comitia curiata) and obtain from it a similar grant. The necessary law seems always to have been voted as a matter of course; and in the late Republic its adoption was a singularly empty form, the curiae being represented by lictors. At some intermediate period the theory that a formal grant of power should follow election and accompany the assumption of office was extended to some of the officials without imperium—e. g. a lex curiata was regularly passed for the benefit of the quaestors. In the case of the censors, a law authorizing them to enter upon the discharge of their duties was voted by the centuriate assembly. No lex curiata or other confirmatory law was ever passed in the case of the plebeian magistrates.

9. Eligibility (ius honorum). The power of the magistrates to strike unfit persons from the list of candidates could never have been exercised on purely political grounds without serious risk of subsequent punishment; and in the course of the republican period the grounds of exclusion were defined, by custom or statute, with considerable exactness. Non-citizens, lunatics, and persons afflicted with serious bodily infirmities were, of course, excluded; so also were women. Condemnation for political offences (and for ordinary crimes and torts when the condemnation carried with it infamia) operated as a bar to office; and it lay in the power of the magistrate to exclude those whose occupations made them infamous. Freedmen and their sons were ineligible, and originally their grandsons also; but in the later Republic the grandsons were eligible. Tradesmen were regularly excluded, trade on a small scale being regarded as an illiberal occupation.

At different periods in the history of the Republic candidacy for office was made conditional on the previous performance of military duty, upon the observance of a definite order of advancement with intervals between the different offices, and upon the attainment of certain age limits. For details, see honores.

Re-election. As early as B.C. 342 a plebiscite forbade re-election to the same office until ten years had elapsed; but from this rule frequent dispensations seem to have been granted. Re-election to the censorship was absolutely forbidden. In the year B.C. 151 the same rule was established for the consulate, but it was abrogated seventy years later.

10. Vacancies and Representatives. The fact that every magistracy was held by a number of persons, each of whom possessed all the powers of the office, and the further fact that the consuls possessed residuary governmental power, excluded the assumption that a vacancy was created by the death or resignation of any single magistrate. Even when a distinct field of administration had been allotted to such a magistrate, his duties could be assigned to a colleague or assumed by one of the consuls. Cases even occurred where the duties associated with one magistracy were temporarily assigned by the Senate to another (e. g. duties of an aedile to a praetor).

The death or abdication of both consuls (if at the time there was no dictator) meant more than a mere vacancy in the consular office: it meant the temporary disappearance of the ordinary government. By the sacral tradition praetors, curule aediles, and even quaestors were bound to resign their offices; the auspices under which they held their respective positions were extinguished, and it was necessary to institute a new administration with new auspices. The situation was the same as that produced in the royal period by the death of the king: there was an interregnum. As in the royal period, the auspices were with the Senate, and the Senate designated the temporary holders of supreme power—one interrex after another, each holding for five days—until the centuries could be assembled and new magistrates elected. As soon as a single consul was chosen, the interregnum was at an end. The interregnum exercised no influence upon the plebeian magistrates, for they were not under the same auspices.

In case of the simultaneous absence from the city of both consuls, it was customary, in the early Republic, for them to appoint a temporary governor. See praefectus urbi.

II. The Republican Magistrates under the Empire. According to the official theory, promulgated by Augustus and accepted by his successors, the establishment of the principatus left the republican constitution intact, and in the early Empire republican forms were scrupulously observed. The magistrates were elected, during the reign of Augustus, by the people; under Tiberius and his successors they were “created” by the Senate and “announced” in the popular assembly. Under both systems they were selected by the princeps, and however independent they might be in theory, in fact they were unable to cross the imperial purposes. They were not, however, the real agents of the imperial government. The emperors preferred to exercise the more important powers of sovereignty through officers whom they appointed openly and directly, and whose authority was theoretically as well as actually a delegated authority. The real officials of the Empire were the prefects and legates of Augustus. The republican magistrates were loaded with honours, but they were quietly deprived, from the start, of all their political powers and confined to the exercise of judicial and administrative functions; and, later on, these functions also were gradually absorbed by the imperial officials—police powers and criminal justice first, minor administrative duties and civil jurisdiction last. The development of the new official hierarchy was practically completed in the second century. The republican magistracies became mere titles, earned by heavy outlays for the amusement of the people. In this form they continued to exist throughout the principate, and were even transferred to the Eastern Empire. Allusions to the tribunate occur in the fifth century; and as late as 541 an “Oriental consul” was elected at Constantinople, and for a quarter of a century the years were officially dated from his consulate.

III. Municipal Magistrates. With the development of self-governing colonies and the extension to allied and subject cities of Roman citizenship and municipal autonomy, there appeared, at the close of the republican period, a municipal magistracy closely modelled on that of Rome. (See Municipium.) Under the principate, this system, first worked out for Italy, was gradually extended throughout the Empire, until the municipal magistrates became everywhere the regular organs of local government. In the legal literature of the Empire, therefore, magistratus regularly refers to the municipal magistracy, the titular dignitaries of Rome being distinguished as magistratus populi Romani.

Bibliography. See Madvig, Verfassung und Verwaltung des römischen Staates (1881-82); Herzog, Geschichte und System der römischen Staatsverfassung (1884-87); Mommsen, Römisches Staatsrecht (3d ed. 1887-88); Karlowa, Römische Rechtsgeschichte, Bd. I. (1885); Willems, Droit Public Romain (6th ed. 1889).